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3 
Results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances 
 
SPAIN is experiencing excessive macroeconomic imbalances. Although adjustment is taking place, the 
magnitude of the necessary correction requires continuous strong policy action. In particular, very high 
domestic and external debt levels continue to pose risks for growth and financial stability. The decisive policy 
action at the EU level and by Spain has resulted in a visible adjustment of flows, reduction in financing costs and 
a reduction of immediate risks. 
 
However, developments over the last year, including further contraction in economic activity, soaring 
unemployment, and the need for public support for the recapitalisation of a number of banks, have exposed the 
vulnerabilities represented by those imbalances for growth, employment, public finances and financial stability. 
More specifically, Spain has been affected by large and closely interconnected external and internal imbalances. 
Strong capital inflows during the boom years contributed to the accumulation of large net external liabilities and 
spurred a large housing and construction bubble. After this bubble burst, the exposure of the banking sector to 
doubtful real estate and construction assets endangered financial stability. These risks to the banking sector are 
being effectively addressed through the financial sector assistance programme and the recapitalisation and 
restructuring of the most affected banks and the strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory framework (1). 
 
The adjustment of external imbalances is on-going but not completed yet, as Spain needs to move towards a 
persistent current account surplus to reduce its stock of net external liabilities: currently part of the improvement 
in the current account balance and cost competitiveness may be driven by cyclical factors. The adjustment of 
private sector balance-sheets is advancing, but will continue to pose a challenge for economic growth and the 
fiscal outlook over the medium term. The housing market has not stabilised yet. Rigidities in product and labour 
markets contribute to high and rising unemployment, and more generally hinder the adjustment of the economy. 
All in all, vulnerabilities to possible real and financial shocks remain elevated, and with them the possibility of 
negative spill overs on the rest of the euro area. These challenges require continued action in the areas of product 
and service markets, labour market, financial sector, and public finances. 
 
In addition, significant revenue shortfalls linked to the rebalancing of the economy, higher social expenditure 
and costs of bank recapitalisation have led to a substantial pressure of government deficits and a steeply rising 
government debt. A sustainable correction of the excessive budget deficit in the medium-term requires 
simultaneous progress on correcting macroeconomic imbalances, supported by further structural reforms to boost 
growth and employment creation and to reduce structural rigidities that hamper the adjustment. 
 
 
Excerpt of country-specific findings on Spain, COM(2013) 199 final, 10.4.2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) See the Commission, services' reports on the financial assistance programme to recapitalise financial institutions in Spain, European 
Economy-Occasional Papers, 118, 121, 126 and 130. 
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9 
In May 2012, the Commission concluded in the first In-Depth Review (IDR) that Spain was experiencing 
very serious imbalances, in particular as regards developments related to the external position, private 
sector debt levels and the financial sector. As to the financial sector, since last year's IDR, a programme 
for the recapitalisation of the financial institutions was signed in July 2012. The programme remains on 
track, thereby contributing to the controlling of financial sector related risks. In the Alert Mechanism 
Report (AMR) published on 28 November 2012, the Commission found it useful, also taking into account 
the identification of a very serious imbalance in May, to examine further the risks involved and progress 
in the unwinding of imbalances in an in-depth analysis. To this end, this IDR takes a broad view of the 
Spanish economy in line with the scope of the surveillance under the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure (MIP). The main observations and findings from this analysis are that the risks and negative 
economic trends associated to macroeconomic imbalances, as identified in the 2012 IDR (1), are still 
powerful and have partly materialised: 
· Negative feedback loops amongst a protracted economic recession, deleveraging and volatile 
market financing conditions remain a tangible threat. Private-sector deleveraging is imparting a 
significant negative impulse to domestic demand and has plunged the economy into a double-dip 
recession since end-2011, which may extend into 2014. Efforts to stem the rise in general government 
debt contribute to compress domestic demand. Structural rigidities and tight financing conditions have 
been hindering a faster and less costly (in terms of output and employment) adjustment of the real 
economy to post-bubble conditions. In turn, the contracting economy and the associated surge in 
unemployment are feeding back into a more protracted deleveraging process. Hence, while the 
adjustment of flow imbalances has advanced in 2012, risks to macroeconomic and financial stability 
have not yet dissipated. 
· Spain has responded to these challenges and to the country-specific recommendations of the 
Council under the 2012 EU semester (2) with efforts to consolidate public finances and reform 
product and factor markets. A labour market reform was adopted by the government in February 
2012 and passed into law in July 2012. A comprehensive reform plan was presented in September 
2012, covering further reforms to support employment, ensure public finance sustainability, and 
strengthen the business environment and competition. While measures have been taken or launched in 
all these areas, the reform agenda remains incomplete, and even reforms already adopted have not 
always displayed their full effects due to implementation lags. As a result, the adjustment capacity of 
the economy remains unsatisfactory, with much of the burden of adjustment falling on employment.       
· According to the Commission services' 2013 winter forecast, the unemployment rate is projected 
to rise further to 27% in 2013 (from 25% in 2012). The share of long-term unemployment is 
increasing, and with it the probability of hysteresis effects that would lower the growth potential of the 
economy. Wages have only belatedly and gradually started to respond to the slack in the labour 
market, partly in reaction to the 2012 reform of the labour market.  
· The reduction in disposable income, rising unemployment and falling house prices (down 31% 
in nominal terms from their peak) are weakening household capacity to repay debt. While their 
net wealth diminishes (housing being the bulk of it), more and more households are affected by 
unemployment. The fall in house prices accelerated in 2012 on the back of a large stock of unsold 
houses and falling demand. Residential investment and construction activity also fell further. The 
adjustment in the housing market is not completed, and further drops in both prices and investment are 
likely to allow a narrowing of the gap between supply and demand.   
· The private sector faces strong pressures to deleverage. The non-financial private sector debt-to-
GDP ratio remains elevated, having declined by only around 15 pps. from the 2010 peak of 227%. 
                                                          
(1) European Commission, 2012a. 
(2) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st11/st11273.en12.pdf 
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The reduction in debt has been faster for non-financial corporation than in the household sector, due to 
different debt characteristics (in particular the long maturity of mortgages), a stronger fall in non-
financial corporation borrowing and larger debt write-downs on non-financial corporation loans. Non-
performing loans have increased and are expected to rise further due to the extended economic 
downturn.  
· Net external debt and the (negative) net international investment position remain close to 
historical peaks. Net external liabilities have stabilised at above 90% of GDP since 2009. The 
vulnerabilities associated with very high net external liabilities culminated in 2012, when a loss of 
market confidence on Spanish assets led to large private capital outflows, which were partly offset by 
official capital inflows. In spite of the recent easing, financial market confidence remains highly 
sensitive to economic and policy developments. 
· Both cyclical and non-cyclical factors have contributed to the sizeable improvement in the 
current account balance from a deficit close to 10% of GDP in 2007 to a deficit of slightly less 
than 1% of GDP in 2012. This improvement has been driven by solid export growth and a sharp fall 
in imports, which can be related to some recovery in cost competitiveness and to shifts in demand 
composition, possibly of a lasting nature. Non-price competitiveness factors and the duality of the 
economic structure (with export companies being typically larger and more productive) have 
supported the robust export market shares performance of Spain. At the same time, the sharp fall in 
imports mostly related to the slump in domestic demand suggests that a considerable part of the 
current account reversal is cyclical. While around half of the losses in cost competitiveness during the 
boom period have been reversed so far, part of this improvement is related to the impact of labour 
shedding on apparent labour productivity. Moreover, the decrease in unit labour costs (ULC) has not 
fed convincingly into final prices. Further competitiveness gains will be needed to underpin the 
dynamism of exports and import substitution, and thereby bring about a significant reduction of net 
external liabilities over time. 
· High and fast rising general government debt has been the flip side of the ongoing adjustments 
in the private sector. The general government budget deficit has fallen from the 2009 peak of 11.2% 
of GDP but remains high at 6.7% of GDP in 2012 (excluding bank recapitalisation costs). In spite of a 
substantial fiscal effort, a faster reduction in headline balances was hindered by the recessionary 
environment and shifts in tax revenue elasticitites. General government debt, which has also been 
affected by the cost of bank recapitalisations, reached 84% of GDP in 2012 and is set to record further 
substantial increases in the coming years. The unwinding of macroeconomic imbalances will only 
have run its full course once the fall-out on the general government sector has also been re-absorbed. 
The scale and interrelated nature of the policy challenges stemming from these imbalances require 
a comprehensive and ambitious policy response. Notwithstanding the measures already adopted or 
proposed by the government, and whose positive effects depend on their swift and full implementation, a 
number of elements can be considered: 
· The rebalancing of the economy and international competitiveness would be helped by greater 
flexibility in the reallocation of resources. This would be fostered by measures to strengthen 
competition in product and services markets (including network industries), improve the business 
environment, support the growth and internationalisation of firms. A review of the growth-friendliness 
of the tax system could also be considered.  
· The adjustment capacity of the economy, the absorption of the large number of unemployed workers 
and competitiveness rest decisively on a well-functioning labour market. To this end, it would be 
useful to (i) undertake a comprehensive review of the impact of the 2012 labour market reform against 
its stated objectives (greater efficiency and reduced labour market duality, higher internal flexibility, a 
  
11 
wage bargaining process that ensures a better alignment of wages to economic conditions, greater 
employability of young workers and greater use of permanent contracts) with a view to ensure its 
effectiveness and (ii) to enhance active labour market policies (ALMP), public employment services 
and vocational training, so as to improve employability and raise the quality and effectiveness of 
training and job matching.  
· The stability of the financial system and its capacity to finance the real economy rely on the swift 
completion of the recapitalisation and restructuring of the banking sector and the strengthening of the 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks foreseen in the context of the financial sector programme. 
Increasing the availability of non-bank financing sources and targeted measures for SMEs would also 
help to alleviate financing constraints on growth and the reallocation of resources. Measures to foster 
a larger and more efficient rental market could help stabilise the housing sector and promote 
geographical mobility of workers. 
· Ensuring the long-term sustainability of public finances will require continuous efforts in the years to 
come. The credibility of the fiscal adjustment would be reinforced by basing consolidation on 
structural measures (including to ensure the sustainability of the social security system) as required by 
the recommendations under the Stability and Growth Pact, and by further action to reinforce the 
medium-term orientation and institutional framework of public finances.  
 

1. INTRODUCTION 
 
13 
On 28 November 2012, the European Commission presented its second Alert Mechanism Report (AMR), 
prepared in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 on the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances. (3) The AMR serves as an initial screening device, which helps 
to identify Member States that warrant further in-depth analysis to determine whether imbalances exist or 
risk emerging. According to Article 5 of Regulation No. 1176/2011, these country-specific “in-depth 
reviews” (IDR) should examine the nature, origin and severity of macroeconomic developments in the 
Member State concerned, which constitute, or could lead to, imbalances. On the basis of this analysis, the 
Commission will establish whether it considers that an imbalance exists and what type of follow-up it will 
recommend to the Council. 
This is the second IDR for Spain. Based on the previous IDR, which was published on 30 May 2012, the 
Commission concluded that Spain was experiencing very serious macroeconomic imbalances, in 
particular as regards developments related to the external position, private sector debt levels, and the 
financial sector. (4) Overall, in the AMR the Commission finds it useful, also taking into account the 
identification of a very serious imbalance last May, to examine further the progress and the risks involved 
in the unwinding of imbalances in an in-depth analysis. To this end this IDR takes a broad view of the 
Spanish economy in line with the scope of surveillance under the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
(MIP). (5) 
Against this background, Section 2 looks in more detail into these developments covering both external 
and internal dimensions. This is followed by two focus sub-sections in Section 3 on (i) private sector 
deleveraging and (ii) external debt sustainability and current account adjustment. Section 4 discusses 
policy conclusions.  
 
                                                          
(3) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32011R1176:EN:NOT 
(4) These imbalances and adjustment challenges were analysed in detail in the 2012 In-depth Review (European Commission, 
2012a).   
(5) This IDR takes into acount information up to 20 March 2013. 

2. MACROECONOMIC SITUATION AND POTENTIAL 
IMBALANCES 
 
15 
2.1. MACROECONOMIC SCENE SETTER 
The credit-driven housing and domestic 
demand boom of the early 2000s left the 
Spanish economy saddled with major external 
and internal imbalances. As analysed in greater 
detail in the 2012 IDR, the strong economic 
expansion in the period 1996-2007 (more than 
3½% real GDP growth per year) was heavily 
skewed towards domestic demand and in particular 
residential investment. This unbalanced expansion, 
which was fuelled by abundant availability of 
external private financing following a sharp 
reduction in risk premia before and after euro-area 
accession, resulted in the accumulation of high 
domestic and external debt, the emergence of a 
massive real estate bubble, significant 
competitiveness losses and recurrent and widening 
current account deficits. The sharp correction of 
this boom in the context of the international 
financial crisis triggered a protracted economic 
recession with massive employment losses. Since 
the beginning of the crisis (Q3 2008 to Q4 2012), 
real GDP has dropped by around 5.7% and the 
number of people employed has fallen by almost 
3.5 million (17% of total employment). 
While the adjustment has started, the 
unwinding of imbalances will continue to weigh 
on the medium-term growth outlook. After a 
temporary stabilisation, the economy fell back into 
recession at the end of 2011. Real GDP kept on 
falling throughout 2012 and is expected to stabilise 
only towards the end of 2013. On an annual basis, 
a projected contraction of 1.4% in 2013 is 
expected to be followed by a subdued recovery of 
around 0.8% (under a no-policy change 
assumption) in 2014. Private-sector deleveraging, 
very high unemployment, tight financing 
conditions, and fiscal consolidation constrain 
domestic demand and imply a profound shift in the 
composition of demand towards net exports (see 
Graph 2.1). As a result, the current account deficit 
has been narrowing and is expected to turn into a 
surplus from 2013 onwards.  
Wage growth has belatedly started to react to 
the sharp fall in employment. The labour market 
situation deteriorated further in 2012. 
Unemployment reached 26% in the fourth quarter 
of 2012 and is expected to keep increasing in 2013. 
Wage growth started to moderate more noticeably 
in 2012, finally responding to the sharp 
deterioration in the labour market. Thanks largely 
to high apparent productivity growth on the back 
of labour shedding, unit labour costs sustained 
their fall in 2012 (-3.4%) and this trend should 
continue in 2013, albeit at a slower pace. Inflation 
remains elevated, essentially due to fiscal 
measures, but also potentially reflecting weak 
competition in some product and service markets 
and the application of indexation clauses. Inflation 
was 2.8% in February 2013, while core inflation 
reached 2.3%. 
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2.2. ADJUSTMENT OF INTERNAL AND 
EXTERNAL IMBALANCES 
Spain faces daunting adjustment challenges and 
risks following the bursting of the housing and 
credit booms. The correction of imbalances 
started in 2008 and is ongoing. The adjustment of 
flows (i.e. current account deficit, investment in 
construction, credit growth) has advanced, but the 
adjustment of stock variables has been much more 
gradual and will take considerable time. Very high 
external debt leaves the economy vulnerable to 
changes in external financing conditions. Restoring 
external equilibrium requires a move to a sizeable 
current account surplus position, backed by further 
improvements in competitiveness and a major re-
allocation of resources to the tradables sector. 
Private sector deleveraging is weighing on 
economic growth, while the economic recession 
and the deterioration in the labour market are 
simultaneously making the reduction of private 
debt more difficult. The bursting of the 
construction and housing bubble has weakened 
bank balance sheets, creating risks for financial 
stability and adding to overall tight financing 
conditions, which can in turn slow down the 
rebalancing of the economy. Moreover, the 
economic downturn and the cost of support to the 
financial sector have resulted in a substantial 
deterioration of public finances, which is reflected 
in the rapid increase in general government debt. 
The links and feedbacks between the sovereign, 
the banking sector and the real economy are 
strong, calling for enhanced monitoring of the 
adjustment progress in all areas. 
An important development since the 2012 IDR 
has been the granting of financial assistance to 
Spain for the recapitalisation of financial 
institutions. (6) Spanish banks have been 
adversely affected by the bursting of the real estate 
and construction bubble and the economic 
recession that ensued. The banking sector was 
characterized in the previous IDR as a source of 
vulnerability with respect to financial stability and 
credit provision to the real economy. Growing 
market tensions in the run up to the request for 
financial assistance of 25 June 2012 confirmed this 
                                                          
(6) See the Commission, services' reports on the financial 
assistance programme to recapitalise financial institutions 
in Spain, European Economy-Occasional Papers, 118, 
121, 126 and 130. 
assessment. Up to EUR 100 billion were made 
available via the ESM, upon agreement by the 
Eurogroup in July 2012, while actual 
disbursements amounted to EUR 41.4 billion. The 
core of the programme is an overhaul of the weak 
segments of the Spanish financial sector through 
significant recapitalisation and restructuring as 
well as a segregation of problematic assets from 
those banks receiving public support in an external 
Asset Management Company (AMC). Regulation 
and supervision will also be reinforced. The 
financial assistance will be provided for the period 
July 2012 to end-December 2013.   
The banking sector programme is having a 
positive impact on the stability of the financial 
sector in Spain. The second review under the 
programme, concluded in February 2013, 
confirmed that the programme is on track. (7) 
Successful implementation of the programme is 
contributing to reducing the funding costs of 
banks. This should gradually feed into an easing of 
lending conditions to households and non-financial 
corporations. Given deleveraging pressures, credit 
growth is likely to remain subdued for some time, 
but this is compatible with restoring credit flows to 
productive sectors. 
The economy remains at a critical juncture, 
leaving no room for complacency on the reform 
side. The capacity of the economy to undergo the 
necessary structural transformation depends on the 
smooth functioning of its factor and product 
markets. The sharp fall in employment and 
sluggish adjustment of prices suggest significant 
shortcomings in these areas. Increasing price and 
cost competitiveness through sustained wage and 
price adjustment and increasing labour 
productivity beyond the cyclical adjustment related 
to labour shedding is a precondition for returning 
to a higher growth path, generating employment 
opportunities, ensuring the external rebalancing of 
the economy, limiting the costs (in terms of output 
and employment) of private sector deleveraging, 
and supporting the consolidation of public 
finances. 
                                                          
(7) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-58_en.htm 
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2.2.1. Current account and external debt  
The current account deficit has narrowed 
further in 2012. The long period of economic 
expansion that began in the second half of the 
1990s and ended in 2007 was characterized by 
rising current account deficits and growing 
external indebtedness (see Graphs 2.2). During this 
time, both households and non-financial 
corporations significantly increased investment 
expenditures, the bulk of which went into 
residential investment. These investments were 
largely financed by capital inflows channelled via 
the Spanish banking sector. As explained in the 
2012 IDR, the deterioration of external financing 
conditions prompted a relatively rapid adjustment 
of the current account balance. The current account 
deficit fell to 0.8% of GDP in 2012, from a peak of 
10% in 2007 (and 3.7% of GDP in 2011). The 
reduction in the external deficit (including both 
current and capital accounts) has been even more 
pronounced. The medium-term evolution of the 
external deficit will depend on the extent to which 
recent adjustments have been of a permanent 
rather than cyclical nature (see Section 3.2 for 
more details). In the short-term, according to the 
Commission services' 2013 winter forecast, the 
external balance is expected to shift from a deficit 
to a surplus in 2013 (1½% of GDP) and this 
surplus is set to double in 2014. 
The improvement in the net lending position of 
the private sector has consolidated. The net 
lending/borrowing (NLB) position of the non-
financial private sector has reached close to 10% 
of GDP by end-2012 (Graph 2.2a). According to 
the Commission services' 2013 winter forecast, 
both households and non-financial corporations are 
expected to remain net lenders over the forecast 
horizon (2013-14). This confirms the assessment 
of the previous IDR. However, there has been 
some shift in the composition of private sector 
NLB, with non-financial corporations accounting 
for an increasing share at the expense of 
households. This development has been mainly 
driven by a change in the behaviour of saving 
rates. Households have been accumulating savings 
since 2008, with the saving rate averaging 14% 
(i.e. 3 pps. above the long-term historical average). 
This trend was reversed in 2012, when the 
household saving rate plummeted to a historical 
low of under 9% (four-quarter moving average) 
amid falling disposable income and rising 
unemployment. (8) Conversely, the saving rate of 
non-financial corporations has been sharply on the 
rise, as companies reduce costs and strive to 
rebuild their balance sheets. The impact of higher 
private sector net lending on the external deficit 
has been largely counteracted by a sizeable net 
borrowing position of the public sector since 2008. 
From a sectoral perspective, the move to a 
sustained current account surplus will therefore 
                                                          
(8) Record low saving rate of households in Q3 2012 has been 
also driven by some temporary factors. Households 
increased their consumption in this quarter as they 
advanced their purchases ahead of the expected Value 
Added Tax (VAT) increase. 
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require further balanced improvements in both 
private and public sector NLB.  
The improvement of the trade balance is only 
partly driven by permanent factors and 
remains incomplete. A precise quantification of 
the relative weight of cyclical versus non-cyclical 
factors is not straightforward (see Section 3.2 for 
more details). In the case of exports, while non-
price-related factors continue to play a role 
(increasing geographical diversification and 
product specialisation), recent improvements in 
price competitiveness should help sustain the 
strong export performance in the coming years. 
With regard to imports, the observed shift in the 
composition of final demand towards exports 
implies a reduced overall response of imports to 
final demand, as their elasticity to domestic 
demand is much higher than their elasticity to 
exports (1.5 compared to 0.6). Nevertheless, the 
slump in domestic demand and the severe 
deterioration in the labour market have clearly 
been key drivers of the fall in imports and have 
contributed to the adjustment in the trade balance. 
Without these factors the current account would 
have recorded a much higher deficit. While part of 
the fall in demand can also be considered to be of a 
lasting nature, further improvements in export 
performance and a further rebalancing of the 
economy away from domestic demand are needed 
to bring about the durable external surplus required 
to reduce the very high level of net external 
liabilities (9) (see Section 3.2 for more details).  
Since 2009, the net international investment 
position (NIIP) has remained broadly 
unchanged in terms of GDP. (10) The NIIP stands 
at a very high level of -92%, substantially above 
the MIP scoreboard threshold of -35%. The 
composition of Spain's NIIP adds to the 
vulnerability of the Spanish economy to external 
financial shocks (see Section 3.2 for more details). 
Indeed, in the first half of 2012, Spain experienced 
a major shortage of private external financing, 
which was filled by an increased reliance on 
                                                          
(9) As an illustration, according to the Commission services' 
estimates, a primary current account surplus of 1% of GDP 
would be required on average to reduce the net 
international investment position (NIIP) to 50% of GDP 
over 20 year horizon. 
(10) The negative NIIP peaked in 2009 at 93.8% of GDP, 
declined slightly to 89.5% of GDP in 2010 and increased 
again to 91.7% in 2011, driven by the denominator effect. 
 
Eurosystem financing. While these problems have 
abated since late 2012, they demonstrate the extent 
of vulnerabilities and the potential repercussions 
on financial stability, the real economy and, thus, 
also public finances. Central bank credit has 
counteracted the potential impact of a 'sudden stop' 
in external financing and a major credit crunch, 
thus making it possible for policy-makers to 
introduce policies addressing the underlying 
structural problems.  
2.2.2. Export performance and 
competitiveness 
Exports of goods and services have been 
resilient. Despite a significant loss of cost and 
price competitiveness during the boom years, 
Spain experienced a modest loss in export market 
share in comparison to other European countries. 
As discussed in the 2012 IDR and in Section 3.2, 
this puzzle can be explained by the duality of the 
Spanish economy (different characteristics of 
export firms compared to the national average) and 
the impact of non-price competitiveness factors. 
Spanish export firms remained relatively 
competitive during the decade prior to the crisis, 
while on average the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
economy recorded significant losses in 
competitiveness. In addition, Spain's good export 
performance appears to be due to improved 
product specialisation as well as to geographical 
diversification. In the most recent years, the robust 
export performance has also been supported by 
some improvements in cost competitiveness, as 
unit labour costs have been falling since early 2010 
(see Graph 2.3a). This trend is expected to 
continue in 2013-14, according to the Commission 
services' 2013 winter forecast, but at a more 
moderate pace. While exports of services have 
been less dynamic than exports of goods in the 
period 2010-2011, this trend reversed in 2012, 
driven by rapid growth of exports of non-tourism 
services (see Section 3.2 for more details). Exports 
of non-tourism services are expected to increase 
their relative importance in the composition of 
Spanish exports in the coming years. 
An unfavourable size distribution of firms may 
hamper further improvements in export 
performance. Spain has traditionally been 
characterized by a relatively low number of 
exporting firms compared to its European peers, 
although this number has been steadily increasing. 
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Thus, the rise in the number of exporting firms (the 
extensive margin) appears to have contributed 
significantly to the growth of exports since 2008. 
However, how lasting is the presence of smaller 
firms in export markets remains to be seen. More 
generally, international evidence suggests that the 
export performance of different countries is closely 
correlated with firm size. This highlights the need 
to review possible regulatory and other obstacles 
that could prevent the emergence of a firm 
structure more conducive to a stronger export 
orientation of the economy (see Box 3.1). 
A rise in apparent labour productivity and 
stronger wage moderation have brought about 
an improvement in indicators of international 
cost competitiveness. Considering the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) vis-à-vis 
industrialized countries (IC-35) deflated by the 
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), the 
appreciation of REER between 2000 and 2008 was 
significant (around 20%) and the subsequent 
adjustment has been much smaller (around 7%). 
The REER deflated by unit labour costs (ULC) in 
manufacturing, suggests instead that Spain has 
already recovered about half of the cost 
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competitiveness lost up to 2008 (see Graph 2.3b-
d), extending further the trend observed in the 
previous IDR. (11) However, the adjustment of 
ULC has been largely driven by the economic 
recession and very high unemployment, and it 
could partly reverse once the cyclical conditions 
improve. Further lasting improvements in 
competitiveness and the rebalancing of the 
economy towards tradable sectors will also require 
further adjustments in relative prices and wages 
between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. The 
adjustment of relative wages has started to be 
supportive of the rebalancing only more recently. 
In the long run, increases in productivity at firm 
level would need to accompany apparent labour 
productivity improvements to a larger extent to 
deliver sustainable competitiveness gains. 
2.2.3. Housing market 
The adjustment in the housing sector has been 
severe but has not bottomed out yet. The 
housing boom in Spain was unusually long and 
intense. House prices almost tripled between 1997 
and early 2008, while the construction of housing 
more than doubled from its 1995 level (see 2012 
IDR). The weight of investment in construction 
reached 22% of GDP in 2006-07, up from 15% in 
1995. This represented a significant diversion of 
productive resources from the tradable sector to 
the non-tradable construction sector. The turning 
point had already been reached in late-2006 and 
early-2007, when interest rates started to rise. As 
the economy still grew by close to 4% in 2007, the 
initial adjustment was relatively soft. However, the 
economic and financial crisis in 2008 triggered a 
much sharper correction (see Graphs 2.4). In 
particular, a combination of a sharp drop in 
housing demand and existing oversupply of houses 
resulted in a downward correction of house prices, 
which has accelerated in recent quarters. 
The fall of investment and employment in 
construction is continuing, driven by residential 
construction. The share of residential investment 
in total GDP fell from 12.5% of GDP in 2006 to 
5.3% in the fourth quarter of 2012, below the 
                                                          
(11) While REER deflated by ULC has adjusted significantly, 
the adjustment has been less pronounced if REER deflated 
by export prices is considered, where only about one third 
of the competitiveness lost has been recovered. This 
implies that improvements in external cost competitiveness 
will not be as fast as implied by the ULC reductions. 
historical low of 7% in 1997. However, the 
adjustment is still ongoing, with residential 
investment falling by 8.7% year-on-year in the 
fourth quarter of 2012. At the same time, 
employment in the construction sector fell by 
around 1.6 million (2008-12), and continues to fall 
even though the weight of construction in 
employment has reached its lowest level since 
1976. In addition, the number of house permits is 
still declining, suggesting that the trough in this 
sector may not be reached before 2014-15.  
Absorption of the excess supply of houses is 
progressing slowly. The oversupply of new 
housing is estimated by the government to be 
around 700,000 units. (12) Demand for housing has 
been weak and is set to deteriorate further in line 
with its fundamental determinants, including 
falling household real disposable income and 
declining population. Tight financing conditions 
and the expectation of further price declines also 
contribute to depressing demand. Sales of new 
houses fell from more than 400,000 in 2007 to 
around 115,000 in 2012. Taking into account the 
number of transactions between July 2011 and 
June 2012, it could take approximately six years to 
absorb the remaining stock of unsold houses. (13) 
House prices are expected to fall further. The 
fall in house prices accelerated in 2012 (-12.8% 
year-on year in Q4 2012), reaching an overall fall 
of 31% in nominal terms and 38% in real terms 
since the peak in 2007. (14) This is consistent with 
what was anticipated in last year's IDR. Given the 
still ongoing adjustment in the construction sector, 
the stabilization of house prices may have now 
been pushed towards 2014, notwithstanding 
considerable variation in housing market 
conditions across regions. Other factors impacting 
on house prices include the elimination of tax 
incentives as of the beginning of 2013 and the 
transfer of problematic real estate assets from 
                                                          
(12) An updated estimate should be available in the first half of 
2013 
(13) Housing needs are estimated to exceed 200,000 dwellings 
per year (considering the evolution of population and the 
recent trends in home composition). To the extent that 
these housing needs are converted into an effective housing 
demand, the stock of unsold dwellings could be absorbed 
in a period of about four years. 
(14) Based on the Spanish National Statistics Institute's (INE) 
house price index. 
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state-aided banks to the AMC (Sareb (15)). Sareb's 
large portfolio of foreclosed assets will consist 
predominantly of houses. While its sales of assets 
are likely to be gradual, its presence may 
incentivise other players in the market to 
accelerate their sales, thus leading to a faster 
adjustment of prices and a quicker stabilisation of 
the housing market. 
2.2.4. Deleveraging by households and non-
financial corporations 
Private sector deleveraging is progressing 
predominantly through the adjustment in net 
lending. The credit boom, with annual growth 
rates of around 20% in the middle of the last 
                                                          
(15) Sociedad de Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la 
Reestructuración Bancaria, S. A. 
decade, was largely driven by loans related to 
construction and housing, although loans for 
household consumption also played a role. The fall 
in housing demand from 2008 onwards, along with 
the tightening of credit conditions, contributed to a 
contraction of credit. In November 2012, (16) total 
domestic credit shrank by 3.6% year-on-year, 
driven by the decline in credit to the private sector 
(-4.5%, see Graph 2.5).  
                                                          
(16) The latest available data are for January 2013. However, 
these data (as well as data for December 2012) are 
artificially affected by the impact of the transfer of assets 
from banks which were already state-owned at the time of 
the stress test to Sareb. 
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Domestic lending to non-financial corporations 
and households fell by 8.7% and 3.4% year-on-
year respectively. 
Despite a significant adjustment in terms of 
credit flows, private sector debt remains 
particularly elevated. Households and firms 
remain overly indebted relative to other EU 
countries as well as by historical standards as 
measured with respect to their assets and their 
capacity to repay debt (see Section 3.1 for more 
details). Overall, the private sector has reduced its 
indebtedness by about 15pps. of GDP from its 
peak, but leverage is still much above the pre-
boom levels and the MIP scoreboard threshold 
(213% of GDP in Q3 2012 against the MIP 
scoreboard threshold of 160%). Given the size of 
the imbalances as well as the historical and cross-
country experience, the deleveraging is likely to 
take long (see Section 3.1 for more details) and to 
continue to hold back domestic demand. By the 
third quarter of 2012, the debt-to-GDP ratio had 
declined by around 7 pps. for households and 8 
pps. for non-financial corporations compared to 
their respective peaks.  
Non-performing loans (NPL) are set to rise 
further. The current double-dip recession could 
put additional strain on the balance sheets of 
households and non-financial corporations. The 
already-record-high unemployment rate is 
projected to increase further and to affect to a 
greater extent those households with formerly 
stable employment, who are the most exposed to 
housing loans (see Graph 2.6a). The level of non-
performing mortgage loans, although still 
relatively low, has been increasing in recent 
quarters, reaching 3.5% in the third quarter of 2012 
from around 3% in 2011. The real estate and 
construction sectors account for the bulk of total 
NPL. In the third quarter of 2012, the share of NPL 
stood at 30% for real estate activities and 26% for 
construction sector, compared to 8% level for 
industry, excluding construction and a similar level 
for other services. As the adjustment of the 
housing market continues and further drops in 
house prices are expected, the NPL in these two 
sectors are likely to increase further in the coming 
months.  
Spanish financial institutions have significantly 
increased their loan loss provisions since the 
beginning of the crisis. This process has 
accelerated in 2012 with Royal Decree Law (RDL) 
2/2012 and RDL 18/2012, which raised the 
provisioning requirements for real estate 
developers exposure. Between 2008 and 
September 2012, banks increased their specific 
provisions by about EUR 92 billion (around 8% of 
GDP). The ongoing recapitalisation of the Spanish 
banking sector under the financial assistance 
programme ensures capital buffers in the event of 
further rises in NPL. (17)  
The high stock of private debt remains a drag 
on growth and a source of vulnerability, 
exacerbated by rigidities in product and service 
markets. Prolonged deleveraging implies 
significant negative effects for growth, financial 
stability and, via these two channels, for public 
finances. Even though risks for financial stability 
stemming from the deterioration of bank's assets 
are being addressed by the ongoing banking sector 
capitalisation and restructuring, they could still be 
reignited in case of a steep deterioration in the 
economic environment or external financial 
shocks. There is in particular the risks of negative 
feedbacks between deleveraging in the non-
financial private sector and fiscal consolidation, 
lower  growth and employment, the capacity of 
households and companies to repay debt and the 
capacity and willingness of the banking sector to 
provide financing to the real economy. The 
negative impact of the necessary adjustment is 
greater in an  environment of inflexible labour and 
product markets (see Section 3.1 for more details). 
2.2.5. Public debt 
General government debt is a rapidly emerging 
imbalance, largely as a consequence of the 
adjustment in the private sector, the weak 
macroeconomic outlook and financial sector 
support. The misalignment between public 
expenditure and public revenues, which were 
based on a tax-rich growth pattern during the 
housing boom, has contributed to fuel the increase 
                                                          
(17) The capital needs were estimated on the basis of an asset-
quality review and a bottom-up stress test. Both the 
baseline and adverse scenarios of this exercise can be still 
considered valid references according to current 
developments and updated macroeconomic forecasts. For 
details, see 
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_
ow280912e.pdf. 
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in debt. In nominal terms, general government debt 
has increased by about 102% since end-2008 (until 
Q4 2012 when it reached 84% of GDP) and is 
expected to reach close to 100% of GDP by 2015 
despite fiscal consolidation. One of the important 
effects of rising fiscal deficits and growing general 
government debt has been a significant increase in 
Spanish risk premia, with knock-on effects on the 
cost of financing of the financial and non-financial 
private sector.  
The 'electricity tariff deficit' implies a 
considerable contingent liability for the budget 
as well as non-negligible macroeconomic risks 
and may negatively affect the debt dynamics in 
the future. In 2012, the deficit (i.e. the gap 
between regulated 'access tariffs' paid by 
consumers and various regulated costs - including 
distribution costs and subsidies for renewable 
energy production) reached over EUR 5 billion 
(around 0.5% of GDP), exceeding the envisaged 
level of EUR 1.5 billion by a wide margin. Some 
new measures were recently adopted to contain the 
deficit in the future, including new taxes on energy 
production, a revision of the annual adjustment of 
regulated costs, and a simplification of the system 
of support to renewable energy sources. Despite 
these measures the electricity tariff deficit is still 
expected to be sizeable in 2013, leading the 
authorities to propose in February an extraordinary 
credit from the state budget of EUR 2.2 billion. 
The accumulated tariff debt amounts to almost 3% 
of GDP. 
2.2.6. Labour market 
The economic adjustment in the context of a 
dual and overly rigid labour market structure 
has contributed to a dramatic decline in 
employment. Employment was affected 
disproportionately by the economic downturn due 
to the downsizing of the construction sector and to 
rigidities in the labour market. The lack of 
flexibility at the firm level coupled with a system 
of dual employment protection has resulted in a 
massive dismissal of (mostly) temporary workers. 
A comprehensive labour market reform was 
adopted in February 2012 and passed by law in 
July 2012. This reform allows firms greater 
flexibility to adjust wages and employment 
(including working hours) to their specific 
economic situation. It also lowers dismissal costs 
of permanent workers and reviews dismissal 
procedures as a means to reduce duality. However, 
severance pay for unfair dismissals remains 
elevated in international comparison, while the gap 
between severance pay for temporary and 
permanent contract is biased in favour of 
employment of limited duration. Given the current 
weakness of the Spanish economy and the 
relatively short time span since the entry into force 
of the final provisions of the reform, it may still 
take some time before its effects become fully 
apparent. However, evidence regarding wage 
moderation and duality appears to be more mixed 
and a thorough assessment of the reform would 
have to critically review the impact on wage 
dynamics and labour market segmentation. Active 
labour market policies (ALMP) play a still 
insufficient role in promoting labour mobility and 
in reducing the occupational and skills mismatch.  
There are growing risks of hysteresis effects in 
the labour market and thereby of a reduction in 
future potential output growth. The 
unemployment rate reached 26% in the fourth 
quarter of 2012 (see Graph 2.6a) and is expected to 
increase further in 2013, according to the 
Commission services' 2013 winter forecast. The 
youth unemployment rate reached 55%. A novel 
trend since the previous IDR is that permanent 
employment is now decreasing at similar rates as 
temporary employment (see Graph 2.6b. 
Moreover, the duration of the crisis has led to an 
increase in long-term unemployment. In the last 
quarter of 2012, more than one half of total 
unemployment was long term - twice the level of 
2008. In this context, the employability of young 
and long-term unemployed (many of the latter are 
low-skilled workers, especially from the 
construction sector) poses a major challenge. 
Improving employability would be important to 
address these risks and ensure the effectiveness 
of the February 2012 reform.  Reinforcing active 
labour market policy could help activating the 
unemployed and upgrading their skills, especially 
for those more at risk, like the young and long-
term unemployed and low-skilled. It would also 
contribute to promote the rebalancing of the 
economy towards more export-oriented sectors. 
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3.1. PRIVATE SECTOR DELEVERAGING 
3.1.1. Introduction 
Private sector indebtedness remains a major 
macroeconomic imbalance in Spain. Both 
households and non-financial corporations more 
than doubled their debt levels as a share of GDP in 
the decade following the introduction of the euro. 
With credit flows averaging around 23% of GDP 
during 2000-2007, the stock of private sector debt 
peaked at 227% of GDP in 2010, leaving the 
Spanish private sector amongst the most indebted 
across the Member States. The large debt overhang 
implies significant deleveraging pressures, which 
will take time to be alleviated and will continue to 
weigh on domestic demand and economic growth. 
The overexpansion of lending has also resulted in a 
large amount of impaired assets in banks' balance 
sheets, requiring public support for the 
recapitalisation of a significant part of the banking 
system.  
While the deleveraging (18) process gained 
speed over 2011 and 2012, the impact on debt 
stocks is gradual. The total stock of debt stood at 
213.5% in the third quarter of 2012, some 15 pps. 
of GDP lower than the peak reached in the second 
quarter of 2010, mostly due to a fall in non-
financial corporation debt. A gradual decline in 
debt is in line with historical experience showing 
that deleveraging processes take considerable time 
and imply large output losses, particularly when 
accompanied by banking and housing crises. (19) A 
reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio can occur 
                                                          
(18) Throughout the text, deleveraging should be interpreted as 
a decrease in the debt-to-income or the debt-to-asset ratios, 
as specified in the text. 
(19) Countries with boom-bust credit cycles typically have deep 
recessions and sluggish recoveries, with GDP remaining 9-
10% below the pre-crisis trend in the next 5-10 years (IMF 
(2009)). Deleveraging episodes accompanied by a housing 
crisis took 5.5 years on average across high-income OECD 
economies and reduced private debt-to-GDP ratios by 20 
pps. If they were accompanied by a banking crisis, they 
took 7 years, the reduction in debt-to-GDP was 30 pps. on 
average and the recovery in GDP was considerably slower 
(see Aspachs-Bracons, et al., 2011). Evidence presented by 
IMF (2012a) indicates that housing crises, which are 
preceded by a build-up of household debt, result in a fall in 
real private consumption and GDP of 4%, on average, over 
a 5-year period. In the absence of a banking crisis the 
decline in private consumption is limited to 2%. 
 
through different levers: (i) negative net credit 
flows, (ii) inflation, (iii) real GDP growth, and (iv) 
debt write-offs. (20) In Spain, it is being driven 
mainly by the reversal of credit flows, although 
write-offs are also playing a role in the corporate 
sector. The prolonged economic contraction 
hampers the deleveraging process via the 
denominator effect but also via its impact on the 
saving potential of households and non-financial 
corporations. Labour and product market rigidities 
and a high degree of price and wage inertia have 
magnified the loss in output and employment 
associated with the reallocation of resources in the 
economy and deleveraging. 
Different benchmarks suggest that the private 
sector is subject to high deleveraging pressures. 
Both households and firms remain overly indebted 
in terms of both the actual level of debt and the 
build-up of debt over the boom period 2000-08. 
When comparing current debt levels to static 
benchmarks such as that based on the MIP 
threshold methodology or pre-boom level of the 
debt ratio in 2000, the required remaining 
adjustment of the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
considerable: for households it would be 24 to 36 
pps. and for non-financial corporations 45 to 60 
pps. (see Graphs 3.1). In an alternative approach 
private debt sector is considered sustainable if the 
notional leverage is stationary (21) - i.e. if deflated 
debt were to evolve in line with deflated assets. 
Graphs 3.1 show that, between 2001 and 2007, the 
gap between actual debt and its balanced or 
sustainable path increased rapidly, especially for 
households. In the case of households, this was due 
to a significant extent to the expansion in liabilities 
associated with rapidly rising house prices. Taking 
into account the recent correction, the gap between 
actual debt-to-GDP ratios and their balanced paths 
is 29 and 12 pps. for households and non-financial 
corporations respectively. The following sub-
sections look at the household and non-financial 
corporation sectors in greater detail.  
                                                          
(20) When considering debt-to-assets, valuation effects on 
assets and liabilities are also important. 
(21) The 'notional leverage' is the ratio of debt-to-assets 
adjusted for valuation effects. It represents an indication of 
the ability of households and non-financial corporations to 
incur liabilities. 
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3.1.2. Households 
Spanish households' leverage grew at a very 
fast pace in the run up to the financial crisis in 
2008. Driven mostly by low interest rates, 
abundant credit availability, and easy financing 
conditions, the household debt-to-GDP ratio 
increased to 86% of GDP in 2010, more than twice 
the level in 2000 (see Graph 3.2a). As a share of 
gross disposable income, household debt surged to 
131% in 2007, from 69% in 2000. Much of the 
increase in household debt was linked to 
residential mortgages. Consumer credit also 
contributed to the increase, although to a much 
lesser extent (see Graph 3.2b).  
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Note: Sustainable benchmark: Private debt is considered "sustainable" whenever it implies that debt evolves in line with deflated 
assets (i.e. assets corrected for valuation effects). In technical terms, the debt-to-assets ratio adjusted for valuation effects (i.e. 
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1995-2008 distribution of this variable for EU27 Member States.
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The increase in household debt went hand-in-
hand with the accumulation of non-financial 
assets. Non-financial assets represent the bulk of 
Spanish household wealth. (22) Compared to most 
other Member States, the gap between household 
debt-to-financial assets and debt-to-total assets 
ratios in Spain is relatively higher. This can be 
explained by the fact that the proportion of housing 
assets in household balance sheets is also higher in 
Spain than in other Member States (see Graph 
3.3a). As such, the household balance sheet 
expansion in the boom period gave rise to a mild 
increase in the leverage ratio as debt grew broadly 
in line with an expanding value of non-financial 
assets (see Graph 3.3b). However, if adjusted for 
valuation changes, where valuation effects on 
debt-generating instruments are minor compared to 
those on assets (in particular considering the large 
increase in house prices), household debt grew 
much faster than deflated assets, implying a sharp 
increase in notional leverage. Even on this metric, 
the debt total asset ratio remains below 20%, 
which is relatively low by international standards.  
The household debt-to-GDP ratio is on a mild 
downward path, driven by an adjustment in the 
flow of credit. When GDP growth contracted 
                                                          
(22) Indeed, 87% of household total net wealth is related to 
housing, reflecting a high ownership ratio and a significant 
degree of ownership of secondary houses, while the 
remaining 13% constitutes financial wealth. 
following the outbreak of the crisis, the debt-to-
GDP ratio continued to increase. Subsequently, the 
debt ratio stabilized and moved on a downward 
path from the second half of 2010 onwards, falling 
from 87% of GDP to around 80% of GDP in the 
third quarter of 2012. As a share of gross 
disposable income, debt fell to 123%, despite 
falling disposable incomes in 2010-12. These 
ratios remain high from both historical and cross-
country perspectives. Household borrowing has 
been contracting since 2009 (see Graph 3.4a). The 
contraction was faster in consumption loans than 
mortgages, but the former account for a small part 
of total debt (see Graph 3.4b).  
Households appear to have gradually exhausted 
their financial asset buffers. During the crisis, the 
composition of household financial assets has 
shifted towards less risky and more liquid 
instruments, in particular deposits. As discussed 
earlier, the household saving rate has already fallen 
below its pre-crisis level. Debt servicing burden 
has risen somewhat from the low levels seen in the 
first period of the financial crisis, as disposable 
income has been diminishing (see Graph 3.5a ). 
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Real disposable incomes are being squeezed by 
rising unemployment, wage moderation and 
relatively persistent inflation due to the impact of 
hikes in indirect taxes and tariffs. Household net 
wealth has also declined (see Graph 3.5b), mainly 
due to the fall in real estate prices, which has 
gathered pace in recent months. Total wealth 
remains high by international standards but near-
term prospects for both incomes and wealth are 
negative as unemployment continues to rise and 
house prices are expected to decline further. 
Moreover, the predominance of non-financial 
assets reduces the degree of liquidity of household 
wealth. All in all, the household capacity to repay 
debt has been weakened and is subject to risks 
going forward. 
The household sector has moved into a net-
lending position since 2008. Falling employee 
compensation, wealth losses on financial and non-
financial assets and increased uncertainty spurred a 
sharp increase in the saving rate to around 19% in 
2009. Subsequently, the saving rate declined to a 
historical low of 8.8% of gross disposable income 
(GDI) in the third quarter of 2012, well below its 
long-term historical average level of 11%. 
Households are expected to remain net lenders 
over the coming years, but the saving rate is 
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expected to remain subdued due to the 
combination of falling disposable income and 
already low per capita consumption expenditure. 
This will limit the ability of households to rapidly 
reduce their debt ratios.  
The pace of household deleveraging is also 
constrained by the high share of mortgage debt.  
More than 90% of household debt consists of 
mortgages, almost all of which have variable 
interest rates linked to the 12-month Euribor rate. 
These mortgages have maturity periods of over 20 
or 30 years. The burden on households has been 
mitigated by the fall in euro-area short-term 
interest rates, as well as by refinancing 
programmes offered by many credit 
institutions. (23) Recently, the government has 
taken measures to protect the most vulnerable 
mortgage borrowers. In addition, Spain has 
relatively complex and lengthy bankruptcy 
procedures for both households and non-financial 
corporations. As a result, bankruptcy procedures 
are rarely undertaken by households and the 
personal insolvency rate is very low. (24) Finally, 
tax incentives for owner-occupied housing, now 
discontinued for new purchases, may be 
discouraging households from earlier repayment of 
outstanding mortgages.  
The rate of non-performing mortgages is low 
(3.5% in the third quarter of 2012) but its rise 
has accelerated recently. This low rate is partly 
explained by generally prudent loan-to-value 
ratios (25) and the legislation that makes borrowers 
liable for all their assets in the event of the risk of 
default. The current recession, if prolonged, could 
additionally strain household balance sheets and 
hamper orderly deleveraging efforts.   
3.1.3. Non-financial corporations 
Non-financial corporations are highly indebted 
relative to other EU countries as well as by 
historical standards. Their debt increased from 
around 45% of GDP in 1996 to around 140% in 
2010 (see Graph 3.6). The debt-to-asset ratio is 
                                                          
(23) It is estimated that households save as much as 30% of 
monthly mortgage payments when compared to the initial 
date when the loan was taken (S. Gonzalez, 2012).  
(24) Insolvencies in Europe’, CreditReform, February 2012 
(25) According to the 2011 European Banking Authority's EU-
wide stress test, the mortgage loan-to-value ratio was 
slightly below 55% in 2010. 
also high, in particular if assets are measured on a 
consolidated basis (excluding intra-sector 
incurrence of debt). The ratio stands at 133% of 
GDP, vis-à-vis a euro-area average of 76%. 
Similarly, when measuring leverage with respect 
to gross operating surplus, a proxy for firms' 
capacity to generate income and thus repay the 
debt, non-financial corporations appear to be 
highly leveraged, as  debt is six times higher than 
the gross operating surplus (see Graph 3.7). All in 
all, Spanish non-financial firms appear over-
indebted with respect to both their assets and their 
capacity to repay debt. 
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activities accounted for 54% of the overall credit 
growth. As a result, the bank debt (26) of the 
construction and real estate sectors represents 10% 
and 32% of total bank lending to non-financial 
corporations respectively in the third quarter of 
2012 (see Graph 3.8a). Other sectors appear 
relatively less indebted and in line with EU and 
euro-area averages (except for sectors like hotels 
and restaurants whose leverage is slightly higher 
than in most euro-area countries).  
The very weak financial position of the 
construction and real estate sectors will 
continue to impact on the evolution of corporate 
deleveraging. These two sectors have the highest 
leverage (measured by the debt-to-asset ratio) and 
account to a large extent for the increase in non-
performing loans in the corporate sector (see 
Graph 3.8b. While the ratio of NPL to total loans is 
around 8% for industry and services not related to 
real estate or construction, it is 26% for 
construction and 30% for real estate activities. 
According to the latest Bank of Spain (BdE) data 
(Q3 2012), 74% of total NPL are linked to real 
estate and construction activities. A scenario of 
higher defaults in the construction and real estate 
sector has been considered in the bottom-up stress 
test exercise of the Spanish banking sector aimed 
at establishing the necessary recapitalisation 
amounts under the financial assistance programme.  
                                                          
(26) Debt is defined as the sum of loans and securities other 
than shares. Loans (banks debt) represented 98% of the 
overall debt in the third quarter of 2012. 
  
The deleveraging of non-financial corporations 
has accelerated in recent quarters. A rapid 
adjustment of credit flows started when the 
Spanish economy entered into a recession in 2009 
(see Graph 3.4). Since then, nominal debt has been 
on a declining path. By the third quarter of 2012 it 
had decreased by around 6% from its peak in 2008, 
although the pace of deleveraging has been uneven 
across different sectors. In particular, while credit 
to the construction sector has adjusted 
significantly, credit to real estate activities has 
been adjusting in line with the non-financial 
corporation sector average (see Graph 3.10). (27) 
This different speed of adjustment of flows is also 
                                                          
(27) Anecdotal evidence suggests that big construction 
companies, which are also present on the international 
market, have started divesting their assets abroad thus 
helping to reduce their indebtedness. 
2%
15%
10%
32%
41%
Graph 3.8a:Breakdown of NFC bank debt by 
sector (3Q 2012)
agriculture
industry (excl.
construction)
construction
real estate
other services
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
09Q1 09Q3 10Q1 10Q3 11Q1 11Q3 12Q1 12Q3
% Graph 3.8b:Evolution of share of doubtful 
loans in total loans by non-financial corporate 
sectors
total
real estate
construction
agriculture
industry (excl. construction)
other services
Source: BdE
3. In-Depth Analysis of Selected Topics 
 
31 
impacting the adjustment of the stock of 
accumulated debt (-41% for construction sector vs. 
-12% for real estate activities). Due to the 
contraction in GDP (denominator effect), the debt-
to-GDP ratio started to decrease only in 2010 (see 
Graph 3.9a). The adjustment in the corporate 
sector tends to be faster than in the household 
sector. This is largely due to the greater 
importance of debt write-offs, mainly as regards 
construction and real estate loans, and the shorter 
maturity of debt. By the third quarter of 2012, the 
non-financial sector debt-to-GDP ratio had 
decreased by 8.4 pps. from its peak. The 
adjustment with respect to consolidated financial 
assets has been much more significant, nearly 14 
pps. However, when measured against equity or 
financial assets (non-consolidated), leverage is still 
on an upward path due to negative valuation 
effects. 
Encouragingly, companies and sectors that 
were highly indebted at the start of the crisis 
have been deleveraging faster. A recent study by 
the Bank of Spain (see BdE Economic Bulletin, 
January 2013) looks at the evolution of corporate 
indebtedness between 2007 and 2011 at firm level 
and by sector. The results show that companies 
and sectors, which were highly indebted at the 
onset of the crisis, have been reducing debt faster 
than the average, while firms that started from a 
low level of debt have actually increased their 
leverage over the period. The pattern has been 
similar for large companies and SMEs. The 
findings suggest that deleveraging can be 
compatible with a healthy reallocation of lending.  
The non-financial corporate sector has moved 
to a positive and increasing NLB position since 
2010, as savings have increased and investment 
has fallen. The increase in gross savings has been 
the main driver behind the increasing net lending 
position. In particular, corporations increased their 
gross savings through two main channels: a 
decrease in the compensation of employees and a 
significant fall in taxes and interest rate payments 
(see Graph 3.9b). In a context of turbulence and 
tight borrowing conditions, companies have been 
building up internal financing buffers by 
maintaining high profit margins instead of fully 
passing the wage moderation on to lower (export) 
prices (28) (see Section 3.2 for more details) as 
well as by restructuring and reducing investment. 
In the near term, the adjustment in non-financial 
corporation balance sheets is expected to continue 
as corporate savings increase on the back of 
improved profitability, while investment in real 
estate and construction continues to shrink. 
                                                          
(28) The need to deleverage and rebuild balance sheets and the 
associated maintaining of high profit margins suggests that 
improvements in external cost-competitiveness may be 
slower than reductions in unit labour costs for as long as 
the deleveraging process continues. 
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The rise in the corporate net lending position 
observed since the beginning of the crisis seems 
to reflect a lasting balance-sheet adjustment. 
The factors that have triggered the balance sheet 
restructuring such as changes in risk premia, lower 
asset prices, and lower growth expectations, are 
likely to shape firms' behaviour in the years to 
come, while the impact of the sudden disruption of 
private foreign capital flows, which have also 
contributed to the rise in the net lending position, 
should progressively fade out. This points to a 
protracted balance sheet adjustment process. 
 
3.1.4. Conclusion  
The analysis above shows that the adjustment 
of private sector debt imbalances is progressing 
but it is far from complete. Deleveraging has 
taken place so far mainly through negative credit 
flows, against the background of difficult 
economic conditions. Households and non-
financial corporations continue to be highly 
indebted and the deleveraging dynamics are likely 
to prevail over the short-to-medium term as credit 
is contracting, house prices are still correcting and 
overall economic activity is deteriorating. Both 
households and non-financial corporations are 
highly exposed to interest increases and income 
shocks.  
Private sector deleveraging has significant 
repercussions on growth, financial stability and, 
via these two channels, on public finances. 
Deleveraging weighs on domestic demand and 
thus growth through negative wealth effects and 
constrained consumption and investment. The 
process is further exacerbated by deleveraging in 
the financial sector and the necessary fiscal 
consolidation, which prevents the government 
from implementing demand-management policies 
to offset the adverse macroeconomic effects. The 
recent easing of financial market conditions, if 
maintained and fed through the economic system, 
will support an orderly deleveraging process.   
Model simulations illustrate the importance of 
market flexibility. (29) A fall in household debt-
to-GDP ratio by 9 pps. over a six-year period 
would lead to a marked contraction in output by 5 
to 6 pps. due to a significant contraction in housing 
investment and consumption n. The high degree of 
real and nominal rigidities in the labour market 
implies a relatively contained fall in wages, while 
unemployment increases significantly. In contrast, 
employment, investment and production would fall 
significantly less if labour and product markets 
were more flexible. The results highlight the 
potential of structural reforms in labour and 
product markets to alleviate the impact of 
deleveraging on the economy.  
Risks to financial stability have been mitigated 
by the ongoing bank restructuring and 
recapitalization programme. The recapitalization 
of the Spanish banking sector under the financial 
assistance programme and the transfer of 
problematic assets to Sareb aim at ensuring the 
stability of the banking sector - even in case of 
further defaults on real-estate development-related 
assets. Yet, bank asset quality will have to be kept 
under close monitoring, also in view of high 
deleveraging pressures. 
3.2. EXTERNAL DEBT SUSTAINABILITY AND 
CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT 
The current account deficit has fallen from 
10% of GDP in 2007 to 0.8% of GDP in 2012. 
Adding the capital account, the external deficit (30) 
was 0.2% of GDP in 2012, down from a peak of 
9.6% in 2007. This adjustment has contributed to 
                                                          
(29) The simulations were run with DG ECFIN's QUEST 
model.  
(30) The external balance (deficit or surplus) is defined as the 
sum up of the trade balance (goods and services), the 
income balance and the capital account balance. 
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the stabilisation of the NIIP in terms of GDP, 
although at a very high level. 
 
 
3.2.1. The net international investment position  
Net external liabilities have stabilised since 2009 
at around 90% of GDP (see Graph 3.11). This 
level has not significantly changed since the 2012 
IDR and it implies continued vulnerabilities (the 
MIP scoreboard threshold is 35%). Inevitably, the 
adjustment of the stock of net external liabilities is 
slower than the adjustment in terms of flows as 
measured by the external deficit. With stagnating 
nominal GDP, interest payments and valuation 
effects have become the main drivers of the NIIP 
ratio (Graph 3.12). Even though valuation effects 
have had a positive effect on NIIP since 2010, the 
estimated cumulative valuation effect since 2000 is 
still negative, around -20% of GDP (European 
Commission (2012b)). Interest payments will 
continue to contribute negatively due to the high 
net external liabilities, even though the implicit 
yields on Spain's external liabilities are slightly 
lower than those on external assets.  
Some of the risks associated with this very high 
external exposure materialised in 2012. The 
2012 IDR stressed that this large external 
imbalance exposed Spain to potential external 
financing problems (Graph 3.13a. In the course of 
2012, private external financing dried out and was 
to an important extent offset by increased 
Eurosystem flows. Already in spring 2010 and 
summer 2011 there were two episodes of private 
capital outflows, which could qualify as sudden 
stops. (31) In 2012, the magnitude of these 
outflows was much higher (Graph 3.13b). 
Consequently, borrowing from the Eurosystem 
rose from around 6% of GDP in spring 2010 to 8% 
of GDP in the summer of 2011 and 12% of GDP in 
the second quarter of 2012. The Bank of Spain's 
NIIP moved from balance in the third quarter of 
2011 to a deficit of 30% of GDP in the second 
quarter of 2012 (see Graph 3.11). This amount 
offset the reduction of external financing for other 
sectors, mainly monetary and financial institutions 
(-21% of GDP), the Spanish government (-6.4%), 
and the non-financial private sector (-2.8%). 
Private external financing resumed in the second 
half of 2012, following inter alia the ECB 
announcement of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) and progress in addressing 
the crisis at euro-area level and with reforms at the 
national level.   
                                                          
(31) Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012). 
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External gross debt is above 160% of GDP and 
the share of short-term external debt is 
significant. Although the bulk of Spanish external 
liabilities is long-term (67% of total liabilities 
including direct investment), short-term debt is 
still sizeable. In the third quarter of 2011, short-
term debt (excluding borrowing from the 
Eurosystem) was 45% of GDP. Even though it 
decreased to 27% of GDP in 2012 (Q3 2012), this 
fall was predominantly driven by the substitution 
of private financing (in particular to financial and 
monetary institutions) with monetary authorities 
financing (see Graph 3.14 and Graph 3.15). 
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3.2.2. External debt sustainability 
External debt will have to shrink significantly 
in order to reduce financing risks and ensure 
long-term sustainability. Even though there is no 
consensus on what constitutes a 'safe' or 
'sustainable' level of either the NIIP or gross 
external debt, available studies generally point to 
the order of magnitude of around 50% of GDP 
(also depending on the composition of liabilities 
and other country specific factors (32)). This is also 
the level recorded in Spain in the mid-2000s, 
before the near doubling of the negative NIIP in 
the second half of the 2000s. The current crisis has 
provided further evidence that large negative NIIP 
can expose countries to severe financial shocks 
and is not compatible with a smooth long-term 
growth path. 
The reduction of external debt requires a shift 
to recurrent external surpluses. There are four 
main channels through which the adjustment of 
NIIP can take place: i) a shift of liabilities from 
debt to equity (while keeping the overall level of 
NIIP unchanged it implies an improved 
composition of the external position and a 
reduction of the external debt, ii) higher nominal 
GDP (denominator effect), iii) positive valuation 
effects, and iv) an external surplus. The first 
channel depends mainly on the decisions of private 
foreign and domestic agents, who react to relative 
risk-adjusted returns on assets. Given the subdued 
outlook for nominal GDP growth, any significant 
contribution from the denominator effect on 
reducing the NIIP is unlikely in the short-term. As 
noted above, interest payments will continue to 
add to the debt burden, while the impact of 
valuation effects is difficult to predict. This leaves 
a sustained current account surplus as the main 
pathway to achieve a reduction in net external 
liabilities. (33)  
                                                          
(32) European Commission (2012b). 
(33) Estimates of the required current account adjustment are 
sensitive to the target level set for the NIIP and to 
assumptions concerning in particular valuation effects, 
interest rates and GDP growth. For instance, with a 
cautious set of assumptions, Goldman Sachs (2013) 
estimates that Spain's current account needs to improve by 
10-15 pps. of GDP from the current (estimated) cyclically-
adjusted level of about -5% of GDP in order to reduce the 
NIIP to -25% of GDP over a 20-year horizon.  
3.2.3. Progress in the adjustment of the 
external deficit 
The adjustment of the external deficit has 
accelerated in the course of 2012. The external 
deficit fell to 0.2% of GDP in 2012, a reduction of 
3 pps. with respect to 2011 (see Graph 3.18a). The 
evolution of the different components of the 
external deficit has been uneven. Overall, the 
improvement in the current account balance has 
surpassed expectations (see Graph 3.16 driven by 
the trade balance, which turned into a surplus at 
the end of 2012. The income and capital balances 
have been broadly stable. The rest of this section 
analyses the evolution of the different components 
and the outlook.  
The high level of net external debt implies a 
significant and persistent negative contribution 
of the income balance to the external account. 
The income balance deficit was on average 2.5% 
of GDP in the last years driven by interest 
payments, the main component of property 
incomes (see Graph 3.18b). Current transfers have 
also been negative, averaging 1% of GDP. A 
certain reduction in current transfers is foreseeable 
in the future, as immigrant remittances (0.7% of 
GDP) could fall given the high unemployment rate 
of immigrants. However, due to the high interest 
rate burden, no major shifts in the income balance 
are expected in the short-term.  
 
The negative energy balance weighs on the 
trade balance. Net external energy dependence 
remains high and has been on an increasing path, 
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although with some correction in the last years (see 
Graph 3.17a). Advances in domestic generation of 
energy, mainly renewable energy sources, have not 
translated into a substantial reduction of energy 
imports. The energy balance has contributed 3.6 
pps. of GDP to the external deficit (see Graph 
3.17b) in 2012, also as a result of an increase in 
energy import prices by 10% on average.  
 
 
 
 
The capital balance has contributed positively 
to the total external deficit, in line with 
historical evidence. This contribution has been 
relatively stable in the last years, around ½% of 
GDP (see Graph 3.18a). The future development 
of the capital balance will depend to a large extent 
on the financial flows from the EU (these flows 
constituted 70% of the overall balance in 2011), 
and as such it is mostly exogenous to the economic 
situation. 
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3.2.3.1. Assessing the cyclical/non-cyclical 
nature of trade balance adjustment 
It is challenging to assess the cyclical versus 
non-cyclical nature of the on-going external 
deficit adjustment. Permanent adjustment may 
come from (i) changes in the relationship of 
exports and imports with their corresponding 
determinants (prices and demand) and/or (ii) from 
permanent shifts in these determinants. In the case 
of exports there is evidence of growing 
diversification of destinations and product 
specialisation (see also 2012 IDR), which would 
raise the sensitivity of Spanish exports to changes 
in world trade. On the import side, the 
responsiveness to final demand would be reduced 
by a permanent rebalancing of demand towards 
exports. As discussed below, the evidence is not 
conclusive about these changes. 
Top-down analyses based on the historical 
relationship between the current account and 
the output gap suggest a still significant role of 
cyclical factors in the external adjustment. This 
overall conclusion is consistent with the 
persistence of an external deficit so far in spite of a 
growing output gap and soaring 
unemployment. (34) However, estimates of the 
cyclical versus non-cyclical factors in the external 
balance adjustment vary substantially. For 
instance, Deutsche Bank (2012), applying 
estimated short-term coefficients to the cyclical 
component of determinants of exports and imports, 
concludes that the non-cyclical trade balance 
improved by around 2 pps. of GDP (2007-11) 
compared to a total reduction of around 6 pps. – 
i.e. around one third of the total adjustment would 
be non-cyclical. Goldman Sachs (2013), based on 
a cyclical adjustment of current account balances, 
shows a non-cyclical improvement of around 5 
pps. out of an overall 7 pps. reduction. 
Commission services' model estimates also point 
to a small cyclical component. Overall, the wide 
range of estimates demonstrates the limitations of 
these approaches and the need to complement 
them with more detailed analyses.  
The apparent improvement in cost 
competitiveness is largely due to demand 
                                                          
(34) According to IMF (2012c), in the presence of more flexible 
product and labour markets, Spain could have moved to an 
external surplus already in 2011, compared to the observed 
deficit of 3.2% of GDP. 
factors. As noted in Section 2, in the period 2007-
2012 cost competitiveness has recovered a part of 
the cumulated losses between 2000 and 2007. The 
positive development in cost competitiveness 
results from a sizeable increase in apparent 
productivity and slower wage growth. These 
improvements are tightly linked with labour 
shedding, partly reflecting the downsizing of the 
construction sector, and the slump in domestic 
demand. To an extent, however, they also reflect 
efforts by companies to improve underlying 
productivity, some belated movement towards 
realigning wage dynamics with underlying 
economic trends and shifts in the composition of 
output away from construction-related activities 
with low productivity.  
A saving-investment perspective points to a 
sizeable non-cyclical component in the external 
adjustment. The reduction in the current account 
deficit over 2007-2011 was 6.3 pps. of GDP. In 
terms of the saving and investment counterparts, 
there were two main drivers (see Graph 3.19a). On 
the investment side, the downsizing of investment 
in housing, 5.8 pps. of GDP in the period 2007-11, 
is unlikely to be reversed fully in the coming years, 
and in fact, as noted in Section 2, it has not ended 
yet. However, in the same period the saving rate 
(as a percentage of GDP) fell by 3.1 pps. and part 
of this reduction may also be of a permanent 
nature, which would reduce the net permanent 
adjustment of external deficit. 
3.2.3.2. The role of exports in the adjustment of 
the external trade balance  
Exports have driven a large part of the trade 
balance adjustment but volume data show that 
the fall of import volumes has been more rapid 
than shown by nominal data. The trade balance 
adjusted from a deficit of 5.8% of GDP in 2008 to 
a surplus of 1% of GDP in 2012 (6.8 pps. 
adjustment, see Graph 3.19b). This sharp 
adjustment was predominantly driven by the 
increase of the share of total exports in GDP 
(around 80% of the overall adjustment) and, to a 
lesser extent, by the reduction of the share of total 
imports in GDP (the remaining 20%). However, 
these shares are significantly influenced by 
different behaviour of export and import prices. In 
real terms, exports grew by 11% between 2008 and 
2012, while imports fell by 15%.  
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The resilience of Spanish exports is manifest in 
a relatively modest loss in export market shares 
compared to other European countries. As 
outlined in the 2012 IDR, between 1996 and 2011, 
Spanish exports of goods and services expanded 
only slightly below the trend for world exports, 
with the total Spanish export market share 
decreasing from 2.2% to 2.0%. This relatively 
good performance of exports was driven by both 
exports of goods and services. While services have 
been less dynamic than goods in the period 2010-
11 (see Graph 3.20a), they surpassed the growth 
rate of exports of goods in 2012, predominantly 
driven by non-tourism services (more than 
compensating for the deceleration of tourism 
services). The rise in non-tourism services exports 
can be related to the increase in direct investment 
abroad by Spanish firms during the expansion 
period, and as such is expected to persist in the 
coming years.  
The relatively good historical performance of 
export market shares does not match with the 
evolution of price competitiveness. As shown in 
Section 2, the REER deflated by consumer prices 
appreciated by 20% in the period 2000-08 and has 
since adjusted by around 7%. This combined 
evidence of good performance with respect to 
world market shares and significant losses in terms 
of price competitiveness has fuelled a debate about 
this apparent 'Spanish paradox'. The two main 
factors which may explain the relative resilience of 
Spanish exports despite competitiveness losses are 
the duality of the Spanish economy and other 
factors related to non-price competitiveness. (35) 
The expansion of exports of goods during the 
crisis has been supported by some strong 
underlying fundamentals: 
· Increasing geographical diversification (see 
Graph 3.20b). The share of non-EU-27 
countries in Spanish merchandise exports 
increased from 27% in 2000 to 30% in 2009 
and 33% in 2011, according to Eurostat's data. 
Exports to emerging markets have registered 
very dynamic growth, especially to Latin 
America, North Africa and some Asian 
emerging markets. This has broadened the 
traditional export base of the Spanish economy. 
· Growing diversification of exports by 
products. On some measures, the Spanish 
export sector is one of the most diversified both 
in terms of products and client countries. (36) 
Furthermore, the weight of more complex 
sectors in Spanish exports is above the world 
average. These characteristics allow Spanish 
exports to achieve an international advantage in 
terms of product diversification. (37)  
·  Going forward, it will be crucial to continue 
strengthening both price and non-price 
                                                          
(35) See Cardoso et al. (2012). 
(36) Hausmann et al. (2011). 
(37) Correa-López and Doménech (2012). 
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competitiveness. The implementation of the 
reform agenda should increase the relative 
attractiveness of tradable activities by reducing 
rents in sheltered sectors, facilitate the 
reallocation of resources, reinforce the link 
between wages and economic and firm 
conditions and remove obstacles to firms' 
growth (see Box 3.1). 
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(Continued on the next page) 
Box 3.1: Firm size and export potential
A small average firm size might limit the export potential.  International comparisons show 
that differences in aggregate export performances by country can often be explained by differences 
in the size distribution of firms and the sectoral structure. For firms that are similar in size, but 
located in different countries, the probability that they export and the proportion of production 
exported are similar. But compared to companies oriented towards a domestic market, export-
oriented firms have higher levels of productivity, are bigger and closer to the efficiency frontier 
than non-exporters (see Ahn (2001)). This is confirmed by analysis of Spanish companies. In 
Spain, firms with less than 10 employees represent around one third of employment in 
manufacturing and more than 40% in services (see Graph 1a and Ahn (2001), Banco de España 
(2013), and Galán and Martín (2012)). Productivity differences according to firm size are 
particularly pronounced in Spain (see Graph 1b). 
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Labour market regulations, administrative burden, fragmentation of the internal market and fiscal 
requirements as well as transport costs may explain the atomization of Spanish firms. The different 
requirements in terms of labour regulations and administrative and tax burden for small firms 
might discourage the growth of small companies (see La Caixa (2012)). Thus, the distribution of 
workers according to company size shows a concentration of firms in the category between 20 and 
49 employees. In addition to institutional factors, trade-related variable costs (i.e. transport costs) 
appear to be a key factor limiting the growth of Spanish firms when compared to other European 
countries (see Rubini et al. (2012)). The geographical position of Spain could explain this higher 
importance of transport costs, especially for exporting firms. However, non-export firms are also 
affected. In particular, the deficiencies in transport infrastructure (a lack of interoperable 
interconnections with other Member States and poor integration between transport modes (see 
European Commission (2012c)) may explain the significance of transport costs.  
Limited access to financing for SMEs can compound small firm size as a limiting factor to the 
export potential. Public support can partially substitute for weak collaboration between SMEs in 
Spain, but it does not entirely help to overcome the barrier of sunk costs, which is especially high 
for small firms and firms that venture into foreign markets. Fragmented business structure and 
large numbers of micro firms increase firm dependency on bank financing, while alternative 
financing sources are underdeveloped. The possibility of recourse to a wider range of financing 
sources could increase the firms' export propensity (see Martín et al. (2009)).  
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3.2.3.3. The role of imports in the adjustment of 
the external trade balance 
The large fall in imports reflects mostly cyclical 
factors, but also shifts in the level and pattern 
of demand. Total imports fell by 15% in constant 
prices between 2008 and 2012, which contrasts 
with a GDP fall of 5% in the same period. 
Econometric analysis confirms that the decline of 
imports was mainly driven by the fall of private 
consumption and reduced investment in equipment 
and in construction. Exports contributed positively 
to import growth (see Graph 3.21a). (38) While the 
contraction of private consumption and investment 
                                                          
(38) With the target of disentangling the different contribution 
of final demand components to import adjustment, a 
regression for imports over the final demand components 
(private consumption, investment in construction, 
investment in equipment and exports) is estimated (all 
variables in constant price terms and logs). Additionally, 
import prices, seasonal dummies and other dummies are 
included in the regression, with sample period since Q1 
1995 until Q3 2012.  
 
in equipment were most likely largely driven by 
cyclical factors, the adjustment of investment in 
construction (explaining around 30% of the fall in 
imports) can be assumed to be largely permanent. 
If part of the adjustment in private consumption is 
also considered to be lasting (as households have 
revised downwards their income expectations and 
try to reduce their debt in a context of more limited 
availability of credit) about one half of the total 
fall in imports could be maintained over time.  
The post-crisis composition of final demand 
points to a lower import content for a given 
level of final demand. The weight of domestic 
demand in GDP decreased by 6.8 pps. between 
2008 and 2012 while the weight of exports 
increased by 5.7 pps. (see Graph 3.21b). 
Econometric evidence points to an import 
elasticity to domestic demand more than twice as 
high as that to exports. (39) The rebalancing of the 
                                                          
(39) The estimated elasticity of imports to domestic demand is 
1.5 and to exports 0.6 
Box (continued) 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
AT FR DE HU IT ES UK
Graph 2a:Extensive margin of exports, by 
country and company size, 2008
10-19 20-49 50-249 Over 249 Total
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
AT FR DE HU IT ES UK
Graph 2b:Intensive margin of exports, by 
country and company size, 2008
10-19 20-49 50-249 Over 249 Total
Source: EIFIGE
 
A relatively low overall extensive margin reflects the high number of SMEs and the significant gap in 
productivity between small and large companies. Spain has similar shares of exporting firms in some firm 
size categories as its European peers. However, given fragmentation of the industrial structure, the total 
extensive margin, i.e. the total share of Spanish companies engaged in export activities, has been relatively 
low (see Graph 2a). The intensive margin (the proportion of overall production that firms export) also tends 
to be lower in Spain (see Graph 2b). In 2010, the intensive margin was the major source of export expansion 
(as firms were recovering from the 2009 slump in international trade). More recently, many smaller 
companies also started to export and the extensive margin became an important export engine in 2011 and 
2012. Weak domestic demand will continue to provide a strong incentive for firms to engage in export 
activity. However, the situation may reverse when domestic demand eventually recovers. 
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Spanish economy towards exports can be expected 
to continue in the coming years, even factoring in a 
modest recovery in domestic demand. The 
balance-sheet adjustment of households, 
corporations and the public sector will continue 
constraining the expansion of domestic demand. 
3.2.4. Conclusions  
While the external deficit is adjusting at a fast 
rate, the stock adjustment of negative net 
external liabilities is, necessarily, much less 
advanced. The level of external debt remains very 
elevated. This high level of external debt and its 
composition increase the vulnerability of the 
Spanish economy to financing shocks. A lasting 
external surplus will be needed to bring about a 
reduction of external debt.  
The recent improvement of the trade balance 
appears to have been driven by both cyclical 
and non-cyclical factors. A precise quantification 
of the relative weight of these factors is difficult. 
The sharp fall in employment, private consumption 
and investment suggest an important cyclical 
component behind the current account 
improvement and the measured improvement in 
cost competitiveness. This is corroborated by top-
down analysis. There is, however, also evidence of 
robust fundamentals, such as greater geographical 
diversification of export markets and products and 
changes in the level and compositions of domestic 
demand. Stronger productivity improvements at 
firm level would consolidate and further deliver 
competitiveness gains.  
Supporting a further expansion of export 
potential is a key policy objective to underpin 
the rebalancing of the economy and the 
improvement in the current account. The 
incentive to reallocate resources towards the 
tradable sector and the ability of companies to 
compete on international markets depend crucially 
on the proper functioning of domestic markets. 
Opening up sheltered sectors, reducing barriers to 
firms' entry and exit and to their possibility to 
grow as well as reducing the administrative burden 
would support this process. There may also be 
failures and limitations in the market for bank 
loans, which could be relieved by developing non-
bank financing sources and by specific measures to 
support access to finance by export firms 
(especially for SMEs). A contribution to exports 
would come also by lower export costs – i.e. 
resulting from a higher efficiency of the transport 
infrastructure efficiency or from export promotion 
strategies that alleviate the costs of export market 
entry for SMEs. In this respect, the Spanish 
authorities have taken, or announced, a number of 
policy initiatives aimed at export promotion. In 
particular, the measures included in the Royal Law 
Decree 20/2012, which enlarge the system of 
warranties to exports, and the plan to create an 
internationalization agency (expected by Q2 2013) 
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with the objective of rationalising public export 
promotion instruments. (40) 
 
 
                                                          
(40) International experience on measures to facilitate size 
growth of small firms, and their export profile, has been 
basically based on advice and information provision to 
those sectors and firms which have been identified with 
higher export potential. Other measures try to associate 
small firms with related large firms (their suppliers, 
partners or clients) for joint actions in the external markets 
(Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio (2011)). 
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Despite the measures already taken by Spain, 
several important and interconnected policy 
challenges are identified in this report. Spain 
needs to simultaneously reduce high levels of 
external and private sector debt, regain 
competitiveness and revive economic growth 
through a further rebalancing of the economy 
towards more export-led growth, taking into 
account the inter-linkages with financial sector 
restructuring and public sector consolidation. 
Developments since the 2012 IDR have confirmed 
the difficulties of balancing these different needs 
and the vulnerability of the economy and the 
financial system to shocks, notwithstanding 
progress in some areas and policy advances.  
The complexity and severity of the challenges 
require a comprehensive policy response and 
close monitoring. The recent easing of wholesale 
funding costs has not yet fed through the real 
economy, and both financial markets and non-
financial sector confidence remain very sensitive 
to economic and political news. With 
unemployment already at extremely high levels 
and growing, completing and implementing 
decisively the structural reform agenda is essential 
to support the rebalancing of the economy and 
hence growth and employment during the 
deleveraging process. A stronger economy would 
back up progress in the consolidation of public 
finances and the stabilisation of the financial 
sector.  
Progress with respect to the timetable of the 
government structural reform plan of 27 
September 2012 has been mixed. The plan 
intended to provide a concrete response to the 
country-specific recommendations under the 2012 
European semester. It covered (i) structural fiscal 
reforms, (ii) labour market and education reforms 
and (iii) product market reforms and measures to 
improve business environment.  
Further steps to strengthen competition in 
product and service markets (including 
network industries), improve the business 
environment, support the growth and 
internationalisation of firms, widen the sources 
of firm financing, and review the growth 
friendliness of tax system would contribute to a 
greater adjustment capacity of the economy: 
· The draft law on Market Unity adopted by 
the government on 25 January 2013 has the 
potential to reduce the fragmentation of the 
domestic market. The first draft of the law 
covers two main dimensions: i) defining 
principles of better regulation and good 
governance  to be applied at all levels of 
government and ii) laying down a general 
principle of 'mutual recognition', whereby any 
goods or services that have been authorised in 
one region can be marketed anywhere else. 
Once it enters into force, this law would reduce 
fragmentation and spur competition and allow 
reaping efficiency gains via economies of 
scale. There are, however, concerns that the 
law could be challenged by regional 
governments, raising doubts about timely 
adoption and implementation. 
· Further measures to enhance competition in 
the network industries as well as to tackle 
the energy tariff deficit appear warranted. It 
is important to ensure the effectiveness, 
autonomy and independence of the newly 
created supervisory and sectoral regulatory 
authority. The 'electricity tariff deficit' implies 
a considerable contingent liability for the 
budget as well as non-negligible 
macroeconomic risks and may negatively affect 
the debt dynamics in the future. Despite some 
recently adopted measures, further steps to 
contain its potential impact on the public 
finances are warranted.  
· Anti-competitive regulations and non-
justified entry barriers, i.e. in professional 
services, remain a problem. A draft law 
aiming at reforming professional services was 
to be adopted by the government by end-2012 
but is still being finalised. Measures to 
facilitate entry and exit of firms - in particular 
to lower the administrative burden, widen the 
choice of company forms, review of insolvency 
laws, increase the availability of financing 
channels to reduce bank-dependency - would 
help businesses to reallocate resources and 
create jobs. Following up on the payment of 
large amounts of arrears to suppliers of 
regional and local administrations, avoiding the 
building up of public administration arrears in 
the future would support firms' liquidity and be 
an indication of improved public finance 
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control. In addition, intensifying the fight 
against the informal economy would contribute 
to a level-playing field amongst companies. 
· The export potential would be boosted by 
the removal of barriers to firms' growth and 
by providing targeted support to 
internationalisation. A review of size-
dependent policies with lock-in effect in the 
area of labour regulations as well as 
administrative and tax burden could reveal 
their role in skewing firm composition towards 
SMEs. At the same time, SMEs may need 
assistance to enter and remain present in export 
markets, an area in which measures are being 
taken. In addition, targeted measures, 
facilitating access to finance for exporting 
firms, especially SMEs, as well as reducing 
transport costs, would also be useful to support 
internationalisation and firms' growth.  
· There has been progress in rebalancing the 
tax system. VAT revenue and revenue from 
environmental taxes in Spain have been 
amongst the lowest in the EU. (41) Moreover, 
tax-to-GDP ratios have decreased considerably 
as part of the rebalancing of the economy 
towards a less tax-rich growth pattern. Some 
recent measures have gone in the direction of 
improving the efficiency of the tax system. 
These include an increase of VAT rates and a 
wider scope of application of the standard rate 
as well as measures aimed at reducing the tax-
induced bias towards indebtedness and home-
ownership. A number of environmental taxes 
have been increased or introduced. Going 
forward, the scope to further limit the 
application of reduced VAT rates (or to raise 
those rates), to further increase the role of 
environmental taxes, notably as regards energy 
and fuel taxes, and reduce tax expenditure 
could be explored.  
The extent of the unemployment challenge 
warrants that the impact of the 2012 labour 
market reform be closely monitored and the 
reforms complemented by accompanying 
measures:   
· It is important to monitor closely whether 
the reform of the labour market is attaining 
                                                          
(41) According to the latest available data (2011). 
its objectives. Recognising that a well-working 
labour market is key to the correction of 
imbalances and to growth and employment, 
aims at greater efficiency and reduced labour 
market duality, higher internal flexibility, a 
wage bargaining mechanism that ensures a 
better alignment of wages to economic 
conditions, greater employability of young 
workers and greater use of permanent 
contracts. Further measures were adopted in 
July 2012 to phase out certain hiring subsidies 
and to link unemployment benefits better with 
job-search activities. A Royal Decree approved 
in November 2012 provided the basis for 
establishing a dual vocational training system. 
On 22 February 2013, the government adopted 
a Royal Decree-Law which contains part of the 
(short-term) measures included in the Youth 
Entrepreneurship and Employment Strategy 
2013-2016. A first assessment of the labour 
market reform was to be carried out by the 
authorities before the end of 2012. 
· An overhaul of ALMP and public 
employment services would help to absorb 
the large number of unemployed and 
support competitiveness. More effective 
ALMP, public employment services, as well as 
intensifying the implementation of education 
and vocational training policies would be 
important complements to the labour market 
reform in this respect. It is key to activate the 
unemployed and upgrade their skills through 
better targeting and provision of training 
opportunities (including on-the-job training) 
and to better link unemployment benefits with 
job search and training activities. These 
measures would also contribute to improving 
the cost competitiveness of the Spanish 
economy in the longer term, including by 
boosting productivity growth. 
Completing the ongoing bank restructuring and 
recapitalisation is essential to support an easing 
of financing conditions for households and 
companies. As part of the financial sector 
programme, the banking sector is undergoing a 
deep restructuring. The restructuring plans are 
designed to minimise the impact on credit to the 
healthier part of the economy (42), but smooth 
                                                          
(42) See European Commission (2013c), the programme's 
second review report. 
4. Policy Challenges 
 
47 
credit provision will also depend on the ability and 
willingness of the stronger banks to extend credit. 
Completing the recapitalisation and restructuring 
of banks in line with the banking sector 
programme, as well as strengthening of the 
regulatory and supervisory framework are essential 
in this respect. The authorities are complying with 
the deadlines and the programme is on track. The 
reallocation of resources within the economy 
would also benefit from the development of non-
bank financing sources, so as to widen financing 
options for companies according to their needs and 
their stage of development. There appears to be 
scope to review the bankruptcy regulatory 
framework to make it more effective, while 
bearing in mind the possible impact on financial 
stability.     
There has been progress in removing 
distortions in the housing market, which 
contributed to promote past disequilibria. In 
particular, the tax deductibility of interest rate 
payments on new mortgages has been eliminated 
and the institutional framework of the rental 
market is in the process of being strengthened. A 
larger, more efficient, rental market would also 
ease geographical mobility of workers and thereby 
improve the adjustment capacity of the economy.  
Fiscal consolidation has further to go to secure 
lasting financial market confidence. The 
commitments under EU surveillance procedures 
provide the framework for fiscal consolidation. 
Putting greater emphasis on the medium-term 
strategy, basing consolidation on structural 
measures, as well as improving efficiency and 
quality of public expenditure at all government 
levels would contribute to confidence building and 
ensure reductions in the structural and headline 
deficits. In addition, there is scope to further 
strengthen the long-term sustainability of the 
pension system and of social security. Regarding 
the fiscal framework, implementation of the 
Budget Stability Law remains uneven. There have 
been important improvements in budgetary 
transparency through more timely and regular 
reporting on monthly and quarterly budgetary 
developments at different levels of government. 
However, the monitoring instruments envisaged in 
the Budget Stability Law, including in particular 
early warning mechanisms, have not been fully 
effective. In addition, preparations for setting up 
an independent Fiscal Council have been delayed 
and it appears unlikely that this body will be 
operational in time to play an active role in the 
preparation of the 2014 budget law. 
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